Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 715a3d7675672d84…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

15.8 KB Created: 2024-12-06 02:30:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2024-12-06
MD5: 9ce250e7dace223506f0d22240530bb6 SHA-1: 24a87a2730fb3913369ae8f67ea459afc57976bd SHA-256: 715a3d7675672d8474b83bedfee8e594b96856fa34a915debf9ae57c171ee366
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The AutoOpen VBA macro within the document is designed to download a file from the URL "http://52575815-38-20200406120634.webstarterz.com/nawBVBlSWH7iu7T.scr" and save it as "C:\ProgramData\nawBVBlSWH7iu7T.scr". Subsequently, it attempts to execute the downloaded file using the Shell() function. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://52575815-38-20200406120634.webstarterz.com/nawBVBlSWH7iu7T.scr
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
9078aab48cbe58214fb2f094fee1e28330160b3f268e62a19f4d3b13f114c9ad		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1513 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
c89e51b1d06b8033808d65da70755bbea30816fc73047dab52aadbb45999022a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9728 bytes

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