Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 714bbbfb880ca037…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.1 KB Created: 2020-11-02 01:27:11 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 3753efe2d071710407bcd9263047a25c SHA-1: 1d4006b448e6a4ec181e1df548c0072ba5e84938 SHA-256: 714bbbfb880ca0371421b2705ab238a95f3987a028fc671c1f003d252d561c05
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation attempt. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure at https://gettraff.ru/wb?keyword=maroon%20color%20code. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the conclusion that it is designed to redirect users to harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/wb?keyword=maroon%20color%20code In PDF document text
    • https://zenovoruzunej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134339910/jebofovegesa_xevumotaso_xusosuru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368964/normal_5f89829065840.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tesewipelevifiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997178/4650049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379043/normal_5f9e108d785e8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viweposedijul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070314/596278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawifimubagibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310986/7b316f406b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jamuseramomuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871426/dagowokujifemonul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dosaremuxabibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739916/kokirawapov-zigumujuvo-pomujazakes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366316/normal_5f91f645c37b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375361/normal_5f8eaad30cdb2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8821e0d1-4155-4c7c-ac08-819765c507b6/37657544012.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tanikanaw/vexepar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/42839e4d-cff8-4cdc-b1b1-023a886939c5/geometry_chapter_4_test_form_2a_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005cd3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CD3 4420 bytes
SHA-256: 578ea60c6d685963c5c1f4d8bb8ab568b079ff469c8e025084907094ae82dccb
font_01_sfnt_off00006bd1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BD1 10056 bytes
SHA-256: e57b78de303244fc386a3ad1838636458b058f43837513ec9bb7393d7bb14031
font_02_sfnt_off00008e0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8E0A 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71

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