Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7133f4f921039460…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 6ca04d66b31d9434c7fe5ec03ba7c926 SHA-1: 0d59b1b0a33074814b8794ffb9d37eb34e9fa3d9 SHA-256: 7133f4f9210394604836aae7c5cdb33debd2d6711041979f32ec2a666339299f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via document attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b9.bin
922da832c7e3af7a64de1c119d1ce49735a371914a62e5ac698ddaebc2b7ce60
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB9 1901 bytes