Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 71201a35f1777c04…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.2 KB Created: 2020-08-19 07:56:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c53932c7a0144f1c4fceb62d18dad48c SHA-1: 3c2879006a67428524e3822eb4e3765febad9346 SHA-256: 71201a35f1777c043a9b8708f637d916ec5ef6b576b5886efb6ef448f142e962
174 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample is a PDF that impersonates a cloud document lure, attempting to trick the user into clicking a link. This link, https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=android+awareness+api+key, redirects to a malicious site, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The PDF also contains a large number of links to other PDFs, suggesting it is part of a link farm designed to improve search engine ranking for malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=android+awareness+api+key
    • http://goninox.nowbiz.net/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969985/gupugagajavixur-soxibiwalixodad-bipob-vufivew.pdf
    • http://files.sparrowhillinn.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070619/9626890.pdf
    • http://fegoku.joshuamilton.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814761/7227f270b183.pdf
    • http://files.charmchi.co/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739011/767677.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4122/4861/files/mimazujudamapewip.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7154/6279/files/wazagas.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/6043/5873/files/83252384259.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/3298/4222/files/causes_and_effects_of_flooding_in_ghana.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/42479515564.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7728/0671/files/51160132376.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2259/7796/files/vomegokoxikizoro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7541/9798/files/faferelitinagexodobijo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8658/5749/files/1192480208.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0451/4473/5909/files/masegaza.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b903.bin
e87e33e89239cfbcd36b454872e6f0ae62bfdcbb918334768a8b5461ffde8960		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB903 5168 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000cabc.bin
e2bc018909cbe50e55ef842cf71ae941a0525f82cf20a6c10f0db9bb5540915d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCABC 15944 bytes

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