Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70fece3b60e818e0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.4 KB Created: 2021-02-24 14:52:02 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: aa462773dbb422b2ef2fbf86e1bd5b43 SHA-1: 13af6e2b0920a879c7684a32024969045829b4bb SHA-256: 70fece3b60e818e0b28d17a62b24700ff1668f14d54cfdb6b178c700ffeb46ae
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to redirect users to phishing or malware distribution sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior are indicative of malicious document activity.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/wb?keyword=what%20factory%20was%20used%20in%20willy%20wonka PDF link annotation
    • http://funomixukipiv.iblogger.org/87131167009.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vorupegesozuzow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453293/00c2914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jomububorava/jgRjajj/85419116445.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kajipazuto/igihHgg/bluff_city_law_coming_back_2020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rabuvimi/asn0UPD/62295893392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jevefelenop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775498/9808508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bunemevomuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134733911/1168203.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nixivezez/fpgjfjh/scary_doll_fake_call_joke_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kimukotepasa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135329918/wemalivejepif_bifikifib_kobolew_tuxepas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vifapuxup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134018045/683dc6cafadb6b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xobuxok.22web.org/patidirifexagujukujaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xamozafi/cICuxor/fish_tanks_near_me_for_sale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4480182/normal_5ffdd361cd606.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://livasesokod.epizy.com/bootstrap_single_page_template_w3schools.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dipibezepipes.rf.gd/rativunizojokusijab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jilevatawew.epizy.com/86342509961.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://viwesusogura.rf.gd/everything_that_remains.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tusajemepo.epizy.com/tefutozozomila.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e856.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE856 5380 bytes
SHA-256: 6fa77bc374d8345221a568f94cddd341bb5bf389f05134737cb6238be500636b
font_01_sfnt_off0000fac1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFAC1 10948 bytes
SHA-256: 479ab6ff335f5264b27b27d3aba4dbd9dc0be18bf6ffc6c4cedaf936e69647fe

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.