Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70de4f5e66707b2c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.7 KB Created: 2010-08-01 04:20:19 Authoring application: daceWis muleDoc
MD5: d47079437b3b9bc4ff34e355b517fd27 SHA-1: 58b93dd494a94ad397cb07440786d3dcebec2130 SHA-256: 70de4f5e66707b2cd1851e6bb5a807d9c0aa34ecf5c41aa874eb704f572d228f
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms, to achieve arbitrary code execution. Embedded scripts and files suggest the intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ML classifier strongly indicates malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 5

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x2A0A 84 bytes
embedded_file_obj0009.bin
24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x2AA8 228 bytes
embedded_file_obj0010.bin
9e0b841e6dff678270a89d0f754ff42cf82438a8938815e633744bd29343fc8d
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x2BD8 1121 bytes
embedded_file_obj0011.bin
c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x3084 199 bytes
embedded_file_obj0012.bin
dba5defda53abad54d8e3975d8bcfa2941dd0442e9bec34bf33b6d0e7f5673ec
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x3198 54876 bytes
embedded_file_obj0013.bin
e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x1083E 77 bytes
embedded_file_obj0014.bin
92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x108D5 56 bytes