Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70d1fe8c0ca1d208…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.9 KB
MD5: 2f76f0516413768a79648f120d161623 SHA-1: 6c572fe5d0f2ade01dbead1cfc338d59e95bde48 SHA-256: 70d1fe8c0ca1d208938f39f930711b4b63d18614c64d6556b1e8c23da7303ba3
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains XFA forms with risky executable scripts, flagged by multiple heuristics and a critical ClamAV detection. The embedded JavaScript is likely designed to download and execute a secondary payload, a common technique for initial compromise. While specific IOCs beyond the ClamAV signature are not directly extractable from the provided evidence, the presence of embedded scripts and exploit indicators points to a malicious document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36836 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36836
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream low PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
04462f810d6eacdacecc9d0a5f3f81bebc722af4415e04da19b520338f642b51		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xD7 67 bytes
embedded_file_obj0009.bin
e2225cee13ca18c4f3cb47dcc1c3e92615b9c9d0574a4971cea51bf3ab93acb6		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x162 676 bytes
embedded_file_obj0010.bin
be34a2470f2b5e7f4185726d987323dfdad1f57455c61b338e56b1b939569cb8		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x451 116 bytes
embedded_file_obj0011.bin
498ab202d75ce066957c9fe548aa1eff253d8a5ebf100c74dd63b7326f94552c		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x510 355 bytes
embedded_file_obj0012.bin
6dfc2cfc739bf5cd5514e048143c782a1af7b4c86ed10bd88203471efa9b3fe7		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x6BE 389 bytes
embedded_file_obj0014.bin
c71a582299d8bc2e1fbab01b2de09bccce709e9343fdcf9c4663a177a72fb073		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x890 40885 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36836
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
embedded_file_obj0015.bin
51d6d76eddb1746e412f89f4d1c1b0d620c60fb4a5641c018e93871be63968a9		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0xA88F 147 bytes

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