Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70d1a011e1090d8c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.15 MB First seen: 2021-06-17
MD5: a3115633e0258ab9847948065e836193 SHA-1: fc054c21c2eda40859da231acc9d4114e66337f3 SHA-256: 70d1a011e1090d8cf8a1f3763ea20c72704759c353f551c43051d116debc5ce0
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and specific heuristics pointing to the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` strongly suggests exploitation of this known vulnerability for client execution. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic indicates that the embedded object is forced to activate, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000f58.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF58 45692 bytes
SHA-256: 58218377c606fa03ae3e98ba58aac95154c45426ca2a2c4bf6a5f34d104b45d5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.ScriptFullName
objdata_01_off00029082.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x29082 254566 bytes
SHA-256: d58e45cc3a60ce012b53972ea70846c80b4219924e4d59541626e9dbb3083e1d