Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70ca9d9f7d598b42…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

98.3 KB Created: 2019-10-27 18:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e34fa45f13fdae4f73c44b7d076c1cfd SHA-1: 6b4c52e4e716ac7608a1140da3e83d3dc2bf896b SHA-256: 70ca9d9f7d598b420e9449e72cebced47e9dba4aefce803f1a856bd17ee2c4c3
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an auto-execute function (Document_Open) that is heavily obfuscated. This macro uses CreateObject to instantiate an object and then calls its Open method with a caption from a variable, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of the Document_Open macro and the obfuscated loader strongly indicates a malicious document designed to deliver further malware.

Heuristics 8

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a2f1533daae216e4e724474229fe45d9f176037097b47781d08236032916e1f5		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 10190 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
e3ccae758165689ad32aca4545f95f43bc21ddabeaf4293a802372bb72b17ced		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 69632 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 9 long base64-like blob(s).

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