Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70c5d9fc2b6a55c1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2020-12-27 17:43:54 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-18
MD5: dbc9311fe29f780194ff6950f65dc0e2 SHA-1: af115b4e774ae13ddb17df702f0a90514cfc91f5 SHA-256: 70c5d9fc2b6a55c17dc87d07c6c832c8c87c04c953a375802d957c3aa6299497
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of malicious activity.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/aws?utm_term=seismic+wave+propagation+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4447626/normal_5fe3792bb0afb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4380522/normal_5fe5e87d1189c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kinojapi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302846/toxikujazijagiwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374980/normal_5fa9c551034e5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://futivodefumir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134861147/146a29e5bf3c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tumokisomagen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134897409/watejumopapesin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/letojeka/vgeiaic/42887760911.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rufamuvobaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134720601/7177028.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nadebexipopajin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134678264/ca1b6d3ee81.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fupelesanu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606305/golizajirog_woluvivagutube_bijizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://relotozaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266658/topoza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/baxadelefofibuz/90039539646.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ecca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xECCA 5484 bytes
SHA-256: 923778e79cdc16d0aaa8fb5f354dc56638674b447038717f76c6e9090725f439
font_01_sfnt_off0000ff65.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF65 10280 bytes
SHA-256: bd349c09f083961f363d4fc3f3ae292b6df5259b58e4c3aebf03da2197dbdc0b
font_02_sfnt_off0001223e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1223E 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3

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