Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70a70985f5ab380a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.9 KB Created: 2021-03-22 17:52:13 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: d238eee1b90fdba57384a46629c4a192 SHA-1: d8e64b712092dd262e88a4de00e2cc0bcf9f9514 SHA-256: 70a70985f5ab380a68391d02a30dfad2c06e9e35c00238535f43782630b4cffa
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The sample was detected as malicious by ClamAV and ML classifiers, and heuristics indicate it uses a browser extension installation lure. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of external URIs and the nature of the heuristics suggest it is designed to trick users into downloading and executing malicious content. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself likely contains exploit code or redirects to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://kuzutuzo.ru/123?utm_term=video++manager+chrome PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pozusonitid/gj8idjc/jenorevakitepiseliniw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://difozoxezepi.getenjoyment.net/gukuwadirujekegafabi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zefutuwukeras.getenjoyment.net/codigo_brasileiro_aeronutico.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nifusesoporiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135309858/bapituxoje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4486367/normal_604ccfe1994a2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luvunamuzem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874488/5115645.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/teganipuputu/jgogcbV/harris_rittenberg_jacksonville_fl.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wudenedu/fhaJja3/99978636475.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xedogigiloli/FihcT60/fobakolopi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fiseguvugele/jd2Lvif/tekalovevirovavixug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kixixowagixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710794/jalojemibok-bemovopoxepufeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4448740/normal_6032c504ea976.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://poxovoxi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135398301/f2f19c3d50.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tewatag.medianewsonline.com/piwatovifazowijazagujusar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://a1f0096d-76f5-425c-b826-5ccbd312c1bc.filesusr.com/ugd/8f8c07_c2d9cd9609f241b09abedfc457afeb23.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://e5eb5b25-b33c-43e3-82d5-57ab1bf863d8.filesusr.com/ugd/b0c717_dff3dbada94243d68a0de3391b11d8bb.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://9170d309-caca-4186-8987-bf6b40ce219c.filesusr.com/ugd/baef12_350463f375d74fe8bfec5de74fa3d287.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0245fb8d-28ae-4765-87b1-6cec380809d5/tubitevidageruli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nopawalaxuwaw.onlinewebshop.net/berserk_manga_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://najekaweza.onlinewebshop.net/medium_voltage_surge_arrester.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://e18e6c05-101e-4f41-9c4d-f518aea09dbb.filesusr.com/ugd/7972b3_1b026bd1cd8d4eed862b84b3fc21b8dc.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bbf72d02-751d-4321-8ab6-02693e21c3fc/kivezizofamojudes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010ee9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10EE9 5108 bytes
SHA-256: dd99784fea8d1c62684e9f03118f8a5dc19f029590384aaa3c32d3a3d834c25a
font_01_sfnt_off0001201c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1201C 11456 bytes
SHA-256: 39ca128af0dfd1329b9ae8af04735417c0f551617b87bef53ab4b185e85fab39
font_02_sfnt_off0001476f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1476F 17720 bytes
SHA-256: 7e72e9c170c5b027100bed42e23586f93d356014f10caf9c9216cbae7ab0f3ae