Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70a4634c5e525a5d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.4 KB Created: 2020-11-01 03:04:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: d23d817883eb32a8302a4e231c658ea8 SHA-1: 9c654a3602bedb4aa18d678a9ba50a6a5d7c6d2e SHA-256: 70a4634c5e525a5df5f2d8832c17c5c2f427027bbf13beca0a59928a5441e5af
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, functioning as a link farm. One of these links, https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=san+andreas+free+apk, is identified as a malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness, suggesting the document is designed to lead users to harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=san+andreas+free+apk In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4394082/normal_5f998a22c1e06.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372673/normal_5f89839632e01.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jubunukaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483214/jenaxidogelafape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nujusokomofevak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134503883/d2b9030fd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365656/normal_5f870aaf9279f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lodirunesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874391/xetuvirabefun-tebura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizekusoviwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453028/nelefozarali.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366319/normal_5f9c56be03d80.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fanawilixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408209/9845282.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1855/9393/files/mamma_mia_2018_google_drive.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/637d52aa-6369-4628-ba75-0f81cb1385ac/61319285703.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zategafozasiru/30150115334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f4c4f54b-c5fa-46e1-883f-24caa72123e8/49767050014.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/758de0b3-ff1a-489a-b8a9-038cda5bb955/22336550866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f2444b2a-88f3-41d6-873e-f0132dceb17d/ziziniwalemagaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006714.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6714 5168 bytes
SHA-256: a2c5136c50e526f8c7983cbfd39d7d72f291fe356d6e8e9d534716963f86956c
font_01_sfnt_off000078bb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78BB 10844 bytes
SHA-256: 88792c6ca1c239f42fccb8e7263e44b5ac3ad838ed54658e428a270a09f2c809

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