Win.Trojan.Vampire-13 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 709becadeb4c37b1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

31.0 KB Created: 1997-03-18 21:29:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: fdc605ca3c3cff6365566a7f96e07b5d SHA-1: 499ad2fcde3f3f746f4bf7c8f37fccd9e668616b SHA-256: 709becadeb4c37b1df3e81155265b800da3794fd08c1589514db176c6c331c41
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Vampire-13 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, specifically identified by 'TOOLSMACRO' markers and ClamAV detection as 'Win.Trojan.Vampire-13'. Embedded OLE findings and anomalous stream data further indicate malicious intent. The presence of AUTOEXEC, AUTOOPEN, and AUTOCLOSE suggests the macro is designed to run automatically when the document is opened or manipulated.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Vampire-13 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Vampire-13
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 27,409 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 27,409 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off000010ef.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x10EF 27409 bytes
SHA-256: db69beca96809a8334d244b9d192236e13a57afc3bf82329b61cdac4d296f05c
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Vampire-13
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely