Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7054dbddcbd8499d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.2 KB
MD5: a481674fbeb9778e10001853898d9c2b SHA-1: c5dfb355b8b02c2ed350e2dcb6065c400d17a0a7 SHA-256: 7054dbddcbd8499dc2a3f61e8fbe57ce8528a057a38749aadde44fb020b51127
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of `EquAtiON.3` as a class name further confirms this exploit vector. No document body or script content was available for further analysis.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000016c6.bin
3a1085fb6fd53eeb8c27780a30b7aca5a12247ab2ce5dbd9a13c97008e921efc		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16C6 1812 bytes

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