Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 702ff40826c39bb0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

303.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-30
MD5: 7a3c736079f6d41d022a52bb9f08ac1c SHA-1: c1bb79815304e42cf44d67e359f59a2ab7ede242 SHA-256: 702ff40826c39bb0fa1ca5c5f1e1163993523882ca4db1fcf52dbe4695c4c4c0
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download and execute a remote loader. The embedded URL points to a suspicious .doc file, indicating a likely multi-stage attack. The presence of embedded PDF files with suspicious findings further suggests a complex, potentially multi-component malicious document.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://103.133.104.112/ui/uiuiuiuiuui%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23uiuiuiuiu.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011600.pdf
a972f34663d31c97a9e23df9ca402a5f7d266af068a055101c5fa37edcf58139
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11600 239104 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00015e00.pdf
be0e20032c9a0e4ffda673c03d822301b4df8bd0f8dca0472453446d1706ad4e
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x15E00 220672 bytes