Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70113d9a105ce230…

MALICIOUS

PDF

61.6 KB Created: 2020-08-25 06:20:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a71d387b75580adc96c5db2452ffd121 SHA-1: b203d9f72ddbf26c7d7798889ad8bccdd2c54f72 SHA-256: 70113d9a105ce2302b3407f4176e67866a463e4fb7cce41d22ad93b773958f68
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to external PDFs, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body also contains a URL that appears to be the primary lure, disguised as a download for 'Adb path android studio mac'. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic and a 'password-protected archive lure' heuristic further supports a phishing or scam attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=adb+path+android+studio+mac
    • http://files.inlandempireinjurylaw.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739247/6077349.pdf
    • http://files.jennadmassage.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437666/80a21dc0.pdf
    • http://xuxemif.jessedochnahl.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775934/navofudipiguwixoxo.pdf
    • http://files.creativityindevelopment.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453332/1642885.pdf
    • http://tiniz.theosleadershipnetwork.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741024/6577076.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1530/6405/files/8429088567.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7576/3353/files/java_web_services_book.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9431/7981/files/advance_java_project.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6678/5949/files/dogejidupoxagaki.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9775/1709/files/boremuwubutobadegi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2328/5928/files/continual_improvement_procedure_template.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1274/2550/files/mefuluxodurogukodilageked.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8832/1438/files/bexuwozexugixeluzutigaxix.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0631/9001/files/budgetary_allocation.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2503/8497/files/relative_clauses_exercise_with_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/2402/9608/files/kevadanivazaxuremupeza.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1142/3902/files/80856412946.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/8116/9051/files/kazaxapopigifuwu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/5137558887.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b218.bin
09a1a817c47d01a63c7a0aeb248824db18289a89d913a16ef252608dd38a9d69
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB218 5408 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000c443.bin
79d1d15a280b05ca568882c3efb802615ddb103641817610a76e2a82f1ed8c97
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC443 10912 bytes