Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 70075557690403c4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 1eef5b36587f1a0fc7980db3d62aad7d SHA-1: 8e385ca5a3706fc6c4cafca6209386ce3e94aaf3 SHA-256: 70075557690403c4746269ce47c312b9429403577e2dcbe06bf1ad916c4de885
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007e.bin
f7a0b3ad43120bf9f571d788c32e27165bd1d2148eaa48663645402df46f60d3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7E 1680 bytes