Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6fc9cffa9081fc09…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

140.8 KB First seen: 2024-05-28
MD5: 6d5b3b6f2e941f32dd08d2de21b77bb5 SHA-1: e82a055e52720d61108ac0ede59f0d36fc44eecb SHA-256: 6fc9cffa9081fc09086d199c892c0f9f0cc16077ea135d7348208db0ce906333
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body provides a lure about financial auditing to encourage users to enable editing, which is a common technique for malware droppers. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR strongly suggests exploitation of CVE-2017-11882.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000076b6.bin
e0cab53211f452e389bd3cfa84809f573843629cbbede12c9beb0acb6e678ef8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x76B6 1747 bytes