Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6fb2ed4cf2445059…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB First seen: 2022-12-21
MD5: 515e74a33142761d569bda5918ce2b3c SHA-1: 410eb627fefb36085bd3719cf52a7f378323ce59 SHA-256: 6fb2ed4cf2445059e3cf1f1952ce139e38187ac952db1fe7ff83f7c07c38e7df
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The object's data is obfuscated and specifically crafted to trigger the exploit, leading to arbitrary code execution. No further stages or specific family indicators were identified.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000006e.bin
bd6bd417596b26fad0c1bc3e54773b1f0af60d8e30d678676b05e5b6241f4c5b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x6E 1943 bytes