Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f755206314a9b77…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

13.0 KB Created: 1996-12-14 15:22:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 1fe59361d7b6e497e59543b93528a4d1 SHA-1: 43e315aba73649a3bdd0ea8e578265a66e96e40b SHA-256: 6f755206314a9b77b1ee3e39d9502b4c3fe2006e1bc9e211135c507030e39a36
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is a legacy Word document containing a WordBasic macro triggered by the 'AutoClose' event. This macro is likely intended to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the 'Doc.Trojan.Helper-1' ClamAV detection and the presence of legacy macro markers. The document body content appears to be unrelated filler text.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Helper-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Trojan.Helper-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001080.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1080 9088 bytes
SHA-256: 63b92d08c6b0dd3a31c83e99f55d357e01bda07e8c151ae8b46114b3cc25730f