Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 6f5e60ca0ca02e1e

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

51.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-10

MD5: abb54098b4cb023c1025e52c23b77314 SHA-1: 21cecb1d1e4200636fee6e766d7dab7ea4a26ed8 SHA-256: 6f5e60ca0ca02e1ea4407335a3c05ac77af23c238d7c21f3eb6eb56b2a4f5907

142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing indicates the sample is an exploit carrier for CVE-2017-0199, leveraging OLE object linking to a remote URL. The embedded URL, http://jmcglone.com@198.12.89.173/www/https_b/www.doc, is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document is password-encrypted, a common tactic to hinder static analysis and evade detection.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE

Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE

OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML

OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://jmcglone.com@198.12.89.173/www/https_b/www.doc

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