Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f36c6e281c20627…

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.1 KB First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: e3ce8c2456f79e0c6049780d525ee1c6 SHA-1: 001bbda9d41c4dcaeba4731f6698dc327e6728bc SHA-256: 6f36c6e281c2062720e8b9db54393bebddcda791fbfb72f47a8c148c5d4d407b
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CLSID identified by RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic). The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, leading to the execution of embedded code. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, and the presence of the objdata artifact suggests a payload was embedded.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000c00.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC00 3646 bytes
SHA-256: 9467a2af7c9d11761a40335538dd7640873b62e5e3ccc529fc73fab419206dce

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