Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f31db5bbdffcfd6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

155.2 KB Created: 2021-01-04 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 9ee696912dd9b1abc7eac2bd9b7cd801 SHA-1: d05f31a0a0e313d1def01771c15cc7eb7d4b5707 SHA-256: 6f31db5bbdffcfd6869ca287c54ab7010c4bdacc510e86fb8fbebc7999d8cdf1
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1047 WMI

The sample contains VBA macros that are automatically executed upon opening the document. These macros use obfuscated strings to instantiate the 'Scripting.FileSystemObject' and create executable files on disk in temporary locations like 'X:\ZfjaGxEE\FKCRoAp.GoRlEtL'. This indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload, consistent with downloader malware.

Heuristics 7

  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
28e0aab9def1820176582f12126397a14f2c858209766b704c735ce1d1db4cc2
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7154 bytes