Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f2f63182861d1ed…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.3 KB
MD5: 8fd6fa7a6742b4120c97080ba02d7657 SHA-1: 046f707e191ab4d91ba378f0d99017b74589162e SHA-256: 6f2f63182861d1edcb3e34dee0798ba33ed8244cdf6c8713bfa641d7446ef4ca
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit, triggering heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the OLE object is forced to activate, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000075.bin
8e9043cd541c248394d9339e390f79f0ccf2fbc08452d5253e7a12dcce907f91
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x75 1505 bytes