Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f25de944f54b3e8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.8 KB Created: 2020-07-31 02:50:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 332bb02690094653e951360035ddc3a5 SHA-1: 2414feade7af9be2acad3ee7919fc2a66a2cd3d4 SHA-256: 6f25de944f54b3e841c7249891b43312225adc47b2af90f143102dd03550e066
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a deceptive title suggesting it is a 'complete key for schools with answers'. It embeds a large number of external links, 16 in total, designed to create a link farm. One of these links, https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=complete+key+for+schools+with+answers+pdf, points to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document's structure and the presence of numerous links suggest an attempt to manipulate search engine rankings or direct users to malicious content, likely as part of a phishing or scam campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=complete+key+for+schools+with+answers+pdf
    • http://files.sueroupp.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070625/datazoxinetosad.pdf
    • http://files.aaronjgodwin.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437941/sivorexunigugaj_fiwupu.pdf
    • http://files.tonestencilart.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398010/7887303.pdf
    • http://files.actcdc.org.au/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775309/zobikagoler.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/581871399.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5631/7091/files/tuvelapopurudedenesede.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3631/9639/files/63310259306.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1669/1612/files/fubonituzixonodepifikuro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4444/5092/files/venutapodubixanal.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6241/1942/files/14351657937.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0378/1015/files/kejojarutifimidukasaf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9942/2881/files/6423310016.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4751/7349/files/39244344932.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5359/6324/files/35931742255.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5743/0176/files/98211962983.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/5911/6182/files/20321047228.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005603.bin
0e328708c52eee1c364827638aee7cb0de49f3bd8df1e6b64e20284a3419bdee
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5603 5464 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000688a.bin
6ba6dfcabdad42cc8687719dc51e2c907a6408c467715f5b7d2bdc266d5df002
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x688A 9824 bytes