Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 6f1e4dd5e4f16602

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

412.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-30

MD5: 4bc5b8d803cbedfc41a1229a47c037ea SHA-1: c1ed2327d436f87c6240c94a44f6517711526169 SHA-256: 6f1e4dd5e4f16602176a0c747749324db542c53ad7efbfa63ec9a97a58341048

110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a remote payload. The embedded URL points to a suspicious domain and IP address, likely serving the second-stage malware. The presence of an embedded PDF with suspicious findings further indicates a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the exploit itself is the primary mechanism.

Heuristics 4

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://OASOSIDFOSWEROEROOWRWERWEREWWW0W83W338W83WOIEORIOWEIROWI3339W99ER8WE9R923R29849284WERWERWE9RW93949498WWOEIROWEOR23489W@192.3.216.155/81........................81....................doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`stream_001_off00000960.bin` `2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x960	252488 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00011800.pdf` `78db816304245bf995522e40c709b6773139a886d14a748770f8a77584a1990e`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11800	350720 bytes

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