Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f0be13909a62a5d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

53.5 KB Created: 2021-09-21 21:23:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: c436484afa0bf471003b35a99bff69e9 SHA-1: 5044032f8cb5ed5e130890166e5f15913343c376 SHA-256: 6f0be13909a62a5d257151b140d27dd0902ad758449ea487a04e571a04bc1223
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes automatically upon opening the document. This macro downloads a file from 'https://ghghghfhfhfh.000webhostapp.com/DHL QA-Tracker.gif', saves it locally as 'Server.gif', and then executes it using the Shell() function. This indicates a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://il.social.s-msft.com/globalresources/Images/trans.gif?cver=0001
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://ghghghfhfhfh.000webhostapp.com/DHL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3cf77bd17969eb3426ad19805efd39448a3261b3335e8d020c7fcf92b17224ec		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1168 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
39872d27475fb30154fc6dd0afc048c9144bd75e44b8821dfc417fe1c93f60e1		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9216 bytes

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