Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6f043d3931c0e953…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

259.2 KB Created: 2021-07-19 11:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 18c03cf4a5a86b7972982de7c4fb0c25 SHA-1: 25b0048e758d562d245b9824a6b9359a1ca91ea1 SHA-256: 6f043d3931c0e953a436e28a29081cd0dfc4057c794699e2f944e91cb337a0a7
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains an embedded OLE object with Ole10Native indicators, strongly suggesting exploitation of CVE-2026-21514. This object is configured to drop an auto-executable payload, likely an executable file. The document's purpose is to facilitate the execution of this dropped payload on the victim's machine.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
ad9a09f065712e7dd84a8037aaa9b3708041e68a3255e783d3ce3ec7cde94d38		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 531968 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
aac7f851e6aeb6ae1a1a1520cc0794540d43e48b5b737edcdd1b384e954270e1		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 525220 bytes
emf_00.emf
d17f2341f17fc50a198e3c545a2e290ccc4a1ed7f650c5f53372d595926ec912		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5168 bytes

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