Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e99f72e9379effd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.9 KB Created: 2021-08-03 04:54:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 3df2b0d161ca5ec28b7dda8b082fb197 SHA-1: 4654efd09e3a60db2a75454771004fca142b63a3 SHA-256: 6e99f72e9379effde02dcfde6b70c8eee1385cfc24fb1a9a9329844142db7bae
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The PDF document employs social engineering tactics, specifically a browser extension installation lure and a clipboard command execution lure, to prompt user interaction that could lead to malware execution. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the embedded URLs point to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a distribution mechanism for further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://elitestrategyglobal.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/94232b5ca2d83f6463ea341c9047e993/guzilabadesolesebosolelub.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://puntolinea.org/userfiles/files/nigipujegawufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dmvassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fe2dc48d876a79315cbd1b842ee65e16/bokabinisofotugiwesemeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xperion.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/36971215aa81b7806fea742faa8885e7/fifepawotige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://j-club.eu/userfiles/file/kegumiluzavufujewokupojaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://absolutelyneon.com/userfiles/file/visozoxufujib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cutletsmeat.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f5dfec0269---22292232030.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kngroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bee17319cb7---53594333057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sidexsideaudio.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bd9dad1f009---26920346828.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ingpiazza.eu/userfiles/files/wuwiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://embeddedhr.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jonadobasotalolalalo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rustproofingottawa.com/userfiles/file/30466287798.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://austria-ex.com/images/blog//file/zabewoxugutapabusotivow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://techielingo.com/fck_uploads/files/19031960074.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aranykoronakft.hu/userfiles/file/14796882900.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cristalensi.com/public/File/fesumejulifa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stepsforstarlight.org/clients/c/c6/c668404594a1c08d975ab50c7bec58f6/File/susoxeme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://treeoflifetolfu.com/clients/0/07/07f122ebb3396bb3f917f2e62af81596/File/mezilelo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://liccuza.ro/stiri_files/file/nutovokukefozijofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://healthmatters.me/userfiles/file/derasewarozata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bhs1966maui.com/clients/64750/File/89255824578.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://oreade-breche.fr/userfiles/file/tixasasudukaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kennedy-jackson.com/clients/f/f7/f78508644b517540cdb1549d93860f53/File/69860749100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gccpay.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9f05aaf2e63c50fed5d0d63c3f632996/zegewotape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://indolabtek.com/Uploads/userfiles/files/17185388679.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=avi+to+mp4+converter+online+free+700mbPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fb48.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB48 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001135a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1135A 17400 bytes
SHA-256: 3f1ceb8615ea558188cf5bee6bbe42e0e9b0604274c45c2ac925f7057fc98df2
font_02_sfnt_off00014134.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14134 10748 bytes
SHA-256: b64d91df47f2ef60c3d347df8e584dc4133accfa31c2b1cf9a95f68dc2aafba5

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