Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e8a4880fe86c44a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.1 KB Created: 2021-09-19 01:18:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 4e31ef18ce6db04dcec90a7555d9b220 SHA-1: 6a8109206712d671fd3677d159ef90319f98d09b SHA-256: 6e8a4880fe86c44a2631b9179ef36c554627e31a830bc13a65a8aa6d79bde435
226 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious PDF identified by ClamAV as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan'. It contains an embedded script payload and numerous external URIs, many of which point to compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The embedded script, while appearing to be XMP metadata, is associated with a PDF embedded script payload finding, indicating it likely serves to initiate the malicious workflow, potentially by redirecting the user to one of the listed URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF differential parser failed info PDF_DIFFERENTIAL_PARSE_FAILED
    The cross-check parser (pdfminer.six) failed on this file: PDF differential parser exited -15. Static heuristics still ran and any of their findings above are valid; only the differential cross-check signal is missing.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=learn+windows+powershell+in+a+month+of+lunches+3rd+edition+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://ebd.su/UFD/7623/files/susuzajoribizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://emblem4home.com/UserFiles/Member/File/nowimexikogago.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://schokoladenfontaene.de/idata/pumerixowuziwet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abworder.com/uploads/files/79763047516.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eric-parnes.shortex.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/17568924225.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.chinahkcarplate.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16138f9bf1d6a7---pelevezifitinikofilibu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://theonejsc.com/userfiles/file/80318348290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://birsamundapark.in/userfiles/files/vasizovekawakudufogomuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lifesmart.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/52146568130.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://polesprogettazioni.com/userfiles/files/6691513274.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sevgiliyevideo.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613dc671d365a---dadebibolilosoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://futurepoolandspa.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/30691574591.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://whatdwellswithin.com/file/42921114221.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://muasamhangmy.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vakifil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bangvetthuong.com/luutru/files/xitujarevox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ricoconsultingattorney.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/43518927043.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://magnumprint.ru/upload/files/jezudixilarugoral.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://el-tall.pl/pics/file/25834616448.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ximangcampha.vn/upload/files/36895598715.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iehyun.com/editorupload/file/duxow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lexcyberia.com/userfiles/files/69436949105.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alsace.annuaire-regional.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nejovuwerenuzirosowaduraz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.detskaoptika.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kebupeletoxirefewukere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cedresarquitectura.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161379c168f033---15677933860.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://contelex.it/userfiles/files/57880814402.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00013ebb.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x13EBB 1721 bytes
SHA-256: 970f40ce1c4b799afa15d6b77f6ac4f2b337e18899e1ad4de7cb5ab55e4bf885
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='SWFTools'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Lizigoyari Cufebeco</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches 3rd edition pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches 3rd edition pdf. Learn windows powers</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches 3rd edition pdf. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches 3rd edition pdf. Learn windows powers</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Learn windows powershell in a month of lunches 3rd edition pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='SWFTools'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-11T08:22:58'
  xmp:CreatorTool='SWFTools'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='6007df3f-e8e4-4155-a09e-acd38d68b272'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='0897ddb0-0fdf-4183-8c7b-1a0c93f69066'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000d532.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD532 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed44.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED44 18088 bytes
SHA-256: cd9ecdffb6eb381506bb676023ca468a6d4c3ea2e4e23d8de29019f7d770d96e
font_02_sfnt_off00011bf5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BF5 11200 bytes
SHA-256: 09eb165a80e2a051fd2af8cd69a9350efc8b8eb1c982fad2742a4f9aa77b6431

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