Emotet Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 6e6f6b58f145fa06

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

158.6 KB Created: 2020-09-15 13:42:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: c9de905ec6e32bf1f7534e2b26f4b001 SHA-1: af12e2428fc8b1d36c58b49e21d8244025ad93e9 SHA-256: 6e6f6b58f145fa06be9bbb1ec69b77c97ec6d245e71fbf4a6b7ad3004ba035a2

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a Document_Open VBA macro. This macro utilizes CreateObject to initiate an obfuscated PowerShell stager, as indicated by the OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL heuristic. The ClamAV detection name further supports the Emotet family attribution. The primary function of the VBA code is to execute the PowerShell stager, which likely downloads and executes a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL

OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762371-0
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `8bee8f90d9dfb3891c7c232e7baf01a2aaa2db95a501fe4ff2d320babae29389`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	22935 bytes

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