Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e6ce813057ec2b9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

291.7 KB Created: 2020-01-14 12:02:00
MD5: 14508d1afccdd5ea6987ea28e1c737e6 SHA-1: 70c840071cceafc57e2f705ba84a3f5269b8f371 SHA-256: 6e6ce813057ec2b904f98868a0abfbf451f81b6978211ef999b9ac7f7505f6a7
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects that exploit known vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759. The embedded URL points to a MSI installer, suggesting the file is a dropper for a second-stage payload. The exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://2mval.com/1/ns8uyl3nawcgvej.msi
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000898a.bin
8fd6ae3feef1704673ec41f4259b0d99c32aaf9a88dcbbe5702df3942c6c1ea9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x898A 15892 bytes