Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e66ee0ec0c9930d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.6 KB Created: 2020-09-01 10:55:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f4cecd58d0aa5de3d5a5089faf03f7be SHA-1: 18e8b232df1d3f613364a7c3062b23ef8f2601a6 SHA-256: 6e66ee0ec0c9930dd46624dcb1fb41ea1af8773f71d6cf75df0159584f5ba474
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a redirector service known to host malicious content. The document body, though obfuscated, contains text suggesting a lure for a 'process flow template', which aligns with the 'SE_INVOICE_LURE' heuristic. The primary malicious URL identified is a redirector that likely leads to a further stage of the attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=process+flow+template+excel+free
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f799a9d80fbb45e8975088f6cd2f7cae.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e643da_33f1ffaa14ee4fa7b278a02ff35f4dca.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f84671_d04017ea41ae45d999a0750b42fceae2.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0fdb6d_6b48ec705ca748d6b34de76c0e4ba533.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/96768c_2ff8e5f24f5b4af3b4ab36d89fead804.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/80835258875.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/0076/5336/files/peralon.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0464/8904/3112/files/86942823149.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1034/2563/files/xomuduxedenojerimezus.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9904c2_817b2142969a4230986551cb0b684107.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0a593f_c7fd28df5e37429fa03f4c061eae8347.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c75f60_55ded3d0a16044fa8673d3aa86362396.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8127dd_9206ecdd8bd44e708b2bc0e6cf83fed7.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6770/3450/files/bosuwobiwulipojedafa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/1907/5737/files/osrs_jad_guide.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b9b.bin
bf94db46e7ad097f13d1e56b57ea61b3c7900ab0593ba0b5924303dfbf5a77ea		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B9B 5324 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007db4.bin
f7f4ddd7eb2f805e6d7ababaa491d8fb7accd65773c479478e1aef38eb7f9cc0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DB4 10768 bytes

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