RTF malware analysis — malicious · 6e619c9c485d786a

MALICIOUS

RTF

110.4 KB First seen: 2024-10-06

MD5: a5b3f3c10070bde9dc1806731c089b2b SHA-1: 7c656238080d636d59affd0b718e7e14d2121fd8 SHA-256: 6e619c9c485d786a19978a3ccda48b79a0a9ee9ed7cd9bd137717345b06ec506

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, leading to code execution. The embedded object, decoded from objdata, is likely a payload or a downloader for further malicious activity. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit technique is clear.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000e86.bin` `dc744f8c8be0a755a333c35eb3321cc05b52b2538793cb572423619404575328`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xE86	2288 bytes

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