Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e60e1cdf012dd0d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.96 MB
MD5: 4a3844a0652ec5646de68893cafc58f8 SHA-1: 8107775f48c6ae5a43bb418fe1b5871575f7339e SHA-256: 6e60e1cdf012dd0d8636d3add9101db39f031b752c40f0417f96dce6491753fd
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers CVE-2017-11882 through the Equation Editor. This exploit is known to facilitate the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of multiple RTF object-related heuristics further supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001116.bin
e64fce98b7d5a94bbd8d437def2cd4a96fc80b0136d387590ab5526d6abb9555
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1116 25552 bytes
objdata_01_off0001917d.bin
ac9bfb081d4e3f91c1d530b09d33124ea631b81e03f3efc0b3eee9f29b094bb3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1917D 463381 bytes