Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e5696451483fb3f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

20.6 KB First seen: 2023-04-25
MD5: ae2c3b9d62727ed548d84daf31533510 SHA-1: 5617f74c9a760599a2083138ce7533fd2e9dca1a SHA-256: 6e5696451483fb3f05c8a9de86e49da1879a890d2754d0ee06f4274525befa6e
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing', which is a common technique for malware droppers to bypass security settings. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000034e5.bin
4f5f8053e68237cea6160f02f3085214f7e1ac87394d2310e2d66b6ac7f1e1c5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x34E5 1489 bytes