Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e4a798f66e03dc4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

674.5 KB
MD5: 5fc077636a950cd5f89468e854c0e714 SHA-1: f1dd41a8b9807a6c18114f106a18fbba99773f75 SHA-256: 6e4a798f66e03dc41bf7d637999854fe363d8a96b6ed6ec0928c7179ac5de267
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, a known exploit carrier. This indicates the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code. The specific exploit and resulting payload are not discernible from the provided evidence, hence the family is unknown.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.