Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e47fcd8fd8d5656…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

126.4 KB Created: 2017-10-31 09:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 67234b2a9dcb7426119f54bf217efd34 SHA-1: afe18e47d8a107418f1a9233a76efe3929a600eb SHA-256: 6e47fcd8fd8d5656f23dc53cbbd703a8b61d0e1e43012a8d661a364485ca9503
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file contains an embedded OLE object with indicators of a payload, specifically a .lnk file, and a URL pointing to a potential second-stage download. ClamAV detection as 'Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0' further supports a malicious dropper role. The embedded OLE object likely exploits a vulnerability such as CVE-2026-21514 to execute arbitrary code, leading to the download and execution of a malicious payload from the identified URL.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cornertape.net/eiuhf384 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: 7cda0efd85d070dee84b6a7912c5cdf39f2c6e94f123c7484e2a5873a67c46d1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 1992 bytes
SHA-256: 38a72b863790191f9e48d0143b1c297fddbc5a7134b9269db8fc98920f57c937
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 5372 bytes
SHA-256: b150ce52f9b4373d93df4d3114856e3cd1e287708608a6d9d585507e0d04d69f

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