Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e2e3353c8b68399…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

33.5 KB First seen: 2023-07-05
MD5: c05958f6cc5768f50275447c5b247562 SHA-1: 1a85a81405eedfdc546399c37b36cc99ad8248ef SHA-256: 6e2e3353c8b683995faca5e261a7905abe1fa5a177ef7737b850aa82f8cd80de
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains heuristics indicating the presence of an embedded OLE object and an attempt to force its activation via \objupdate, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger malicious content. The embedded OLE object is likely a payload designed to exploit vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004432.bin
64525163d96a97c10a3afe32291d8d6ba519daf525f9bebb5f6ee1793364e16b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4432 1731 bytes