Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e2449ed97a67558…

MALICIOUS

RTF

31.8 KB First seen: 2022-12-08
MD5: a107106fb43e0ded99c1002938703532 SHA-1: 4833ad7b724197c62db8535466366821942c3ed7 SHA-256: 6e2449ed97a675583b51a2f9f67a2d576a97bf0ea8b780e82eb8bcc563cf9cc5
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by an \objupdate directive. This strongly suggests an exploit targeting a known Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882 or similar). The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based or exploit-based document malware to bypass security warnings and activate the malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004f0c.bin
dcd99e3ca360941ef23b1722e5dfc86f9fdc085c2243d72f77f95704480c5945
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4F0C 1901 bytes