Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e23232f34eac266…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.6 KB Created: 2021-09-17 02:54:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 364a8addad1851587a987a9f327470c6 SHA-1: 85337c72abe0e85c69ac96fd641e7345e8fac152 SHA-256: 6e23232f34eac2666e71e3f3de15497177194927b4b0060999a8caa716df0981
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised WordPress upload directories or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users. The 'SE_DOCUSIGN_LURE' heuristic indicates an impersonation of a document signing service, likely to trick users into clicking the malicious links. The 'SE_URGENCY_LURE' heuristic further supports this by suggesting the document contains language designed to prompt immediate action.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9846

Heuristics 7

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Document signing service impersonation lure medium SE_DOCUSIGN_LURE
    Document impersonates DocuSign, Adobe Sign, or a similar signing service in a signing-request context
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wastran.ru/uplcv?utm_term=insert+signature+in+word+android PDF link annotation
    • https://melz-feu.ru/upload/61203947061.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://windcampus.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613b0b5f462e8---jadegi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jkmart.net/FCKFiles/File/63080672163.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://orgue-chantepie.info/FCKeditor/upload/file/31571146316.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ncsccalgary.com/userfiles/files/fosuvujapebuzafuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://poddertradingandindustries.com/userfiles/file/rovidewexunizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://esen.life/userfiles/file/48998454933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gkia.org/kingkong/userfiles/files/firelawenuburakamokarapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://waetsukai.jp/system/ckfinder/userfiles/files/rarozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://epwuae.com/userfiles/file/viwakef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tsydesign.com/userfiles/jws/files/3216872979.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.conkite.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/26a50fa4b5d30c93942a9ae89331e619/levaze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://guide-eq.com/userfiles/file/20210916053132_3yvkwn.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nazragame.com/calisma2/files/uploads/68803796819.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://presstone.hu/userfiles/file/89657277660.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://veglifekc.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dibap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chrisnoblelaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/2933313406.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.brunosistemi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613d15cd7f962---11747437064.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://psychotherapie-coeppicus.ch/userfiles/files/zenimatujevexolesumes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.kinoimaging.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614042872eaa7---bubijifopebajivarokoses.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cortemadera.com/wysiwygfiles/file/23083208131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jdsliquorlocker.com/nbloom/fckuploads/file/zavimilezizaguwiletovof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tostonet.cl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zizixire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mintedimages.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sosefirekerirav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiogiovannone.com/userfiles/files/pilaxiwoxugaxuwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jevades.com/aircraft/fckimages/file/41151978567.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d94d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD94D 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f15f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF15F 18224 bytes
SHA-256: a2be483d231493513a6ccfba145e4d164dc7ebbd25bbe9fa054767c7989b3aed
font_02_sfnt_off000120a9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x120A9 10512 bytes
SHA-256: e81b5c1c63c0fbe9331d9d794e009f9108bdd50ac65d59c27332ed7acdb170a9

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.