Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6e0ddbc4902f66c6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.6 KB Created: 2020-11-04 07:36:46 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 50ed55dc6180e0e0bda91051a4a57d47 SHA-1: 1700aac85e6b71830639488100e9cc4062efd0c9 SHA-256: 6e0ddbc4902f66c673ce0cedeb94736a6a77060f14d01e9f9e96bcfce543ff97
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable domains or redirectors, indicating a link farm or SEO poisoning attempt. One prominent link directs to 'gettraff.ru', a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. While no scripts were extracted, the structure and embedded links strongly suggest a malicious intent to redirect users to harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?keyword=patterns+of+evolution+and+selection+answers In PDF document text
    • https://gazonuzurixe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134485976/lijigerod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sazoxizifa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134505384/leladexi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vonubaxuted.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452839/3030887.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://toziraza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134506396/78b1c25d97.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodipewelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637384/8119476.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://livabawixegi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320323/namupotoruwev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vaxajiwozoli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637631/menopeda-fugijumetijo-mavenidimadizem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/4918653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekubuzebebam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739705/8138098.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378171/normal_5f9a908046193.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/keyboard_alt_codes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tadovu/47391076400.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/0449/2438/files/rl_trading_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rerinago/54028511197.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gotijejaj/resume_if_never_had_a_job.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/farezelof/49175160986.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006202.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6202 5168 bytes
SHA-256: 689389630955c91b9a8c2cb542aa6cf507ad71cacc9e43c45c2ec2fac18abd96
font_01_sfnt_off000073b9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73B9 9736 bytes
SHA-256: 6c3a8eb296fc6d5d69c6b37060b21f256bf10eb111855f5473d88ee856b3202d