Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6dfbe382bad8e1ab…

MALICIOUS

PDF

111.4 KB Created: 2020-12-19 00:52:22 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: acc70ab9bb4814e2923fc673780a4d60 SHA-1: 89d5eebc55214053df62b54ab81ea33cc08fcc3f SHA-256: 6dfbe382bad8e1ab2dfb0a068b61dfa007e14751607fe5529bed00bbd18ef9a3
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one critical heuristic identifying it as a link farm and another flagging a specific URL as a malicious redirector. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links suggest an attempt to lure users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/strik?utm_term=howard+zinn+chapter+1 In PDF document text
    • https://gomamatugapisum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134392688/519571.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dumetokewip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134394823/2b8c5c8e765e554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lafadulow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134591129/6353931.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384143/normal_5f8fafd815463.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406208/normal_5fa31eb412803.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zomujowedava.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134629266/fb477862065a51.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4451762/normal_5fbba47d14fe8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4451929/normal_5fbcd57fe02e2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jawasolasazilem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379174/gevoderovepiru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/besafefaf/sisizepejubekebetub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jivagajamav/mumelimileguf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wibadinavosunom/44319540345.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gixirojozogufux/adblock_plus_for_safari.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001625c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1625C 3180 bytes
SHA-256: c5ec5e7dd2c6cee1c3240aef4fa622996324e4c54c637a8dd93101ec5cfaacdd
font_01_sfnt_off00016d53.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16D53 4892 bytes
SHA-256: ecd9696173e350cc9f6b42295d1554b1c0d0a80b49f7e9187022c99622b2d1e3
font_02_sfnt_off00017e02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17E02 10856 bytes
SHA-256: 2328ad622f7b83c641d4f77166cc9cec65a01bf5f79ba2a3a72081eb47babe98
font_03_sfnt_off0001a231.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A231 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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