Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6df6c10f882b5c56…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

113.4 KB Created: 2020-06-30 08:09:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: ddc0b36821b81be697b90baec25798a8 SHA-1: 286e53c12e8260d1e2363114141aed8f72996245 SHA-256: 6df6c10f882b5c56a22a14ef9ed611ebcb2e75e0977f784bc9e49fcea55f7466
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1218.010 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32

The sample is an Office document containing VBA macros. The 'autoopen' subroutine is present and calls Shell() and URLDownloadToFile, indicating a downloader functionality. The script explicitly constructs the URL 'http://technodroidstore.tk/wp-content/plugins/sheet-music-library/_WgE2fcIjkMVSpvG6.php?x=MDAwMSCavhlnM1n8jhvQHi8BIl0WCqQcoj2XDZ--FPGUNQrnmCmXh74O0ULhy_SWWrISJDyZ5U7-p1wuJtu7798sq8synKeM9WNuVvGsnkX6Hp-iq0fOpyFMjCp3jig8wTa_uEi5iwK3aSHhoWc4__Gd' to download a file to 'c:\programdata\1.dat', which is then executed via 'regsvr32'. This chain of actions strongly suggests the document is a loader for a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.GreenBox6-9139694-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.GreenBox6-9139694-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://technodroidstore.tk/wp-content/plugins/sheet-music-library/_WgE2fcIjkMVSpvG6.php?x=MDAwMSCavhlnM1n8jhvQHi8BIl0WCqQcoj2XDZ--FPGUNQrnmCmXh74O0ULhy_SWWrISJDyZ5U7-p1wuJtu7798sq8synKeM9WNuVvGsnkX6Hp-iq0fOpyFMjCp3jig8wTa_uEi5iwK3aSHhoWc4__Gd
    • http://technodroidstore.tk/wp-content/plugins/sheet-music-library/_WgE2fcIjkMVSpvG6.php?x=MDAwMSCavhlnM1n8jhvQHi8BIl0WCqQcoj2XDZ--FPGUNQrnmCmXh74O0ULhy_SWWrISJDyZ5U7-p1wuJtu7798sq8synKeM9WNuVvGsnkX6Hp-iq0fOpyFMjCp3jig8wTa_uEi5iwK3aSHhoWc4__Gd�
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
4f87fa521ada50c51a21944c1d32abef8b55ec584d5e48f6a2d92687f4694804		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2156 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
3c4dbf583e1f51502e3d2332c7e4286dc7ecad58d6af28c9e0d6d95625916a09		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 19456 bytes

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