Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6def70303b98dd64…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.9 KB First seen: 2022-11-07
MD5: 7348514a11b4d18770e0d73c19e59472 SHA-1: 040579750f1cca9eadd2e4b16955ae324ee77c20 SHA-256: 6def70303b98dd64b380114314a671e47d06390d1182b8ee74e93697198029ae
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to automatically activate the object upon opening. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security and trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000424b.bin
478aa509d0c2f1544c3b17e02da3e097d5c2a9e43c8a4e3316efb35973c8ff8c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x424B 1548 bytes