Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6ddecbf629ef2e79…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.0 KB Created: 2021-06-04 15:46:01 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 59835cda8d23abd1e668f593084bb2c9 SHA-1: ef993afac559ea46ae2289d44f20cf8501687b6f SHA-256: 6ddecbf629ef2e7954a951b776f17c6bb06e8d398b4fecab84ff282b78d3c3a2
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing lure. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to redirect users to malicious sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior are indicative of techniques used to distribute malware or conduct phishing campaigns.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gimoguvi.ru/123?utm_term=geometric+sequence+and+series+worksheet+answer+key PDF link annotation
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/boxuluwinel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://koponabunabo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134520941/1d5e6528e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://donadoleli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134519335/roretuzikisa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://milonotupilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347339/zufudadetufesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fusagepewaliwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135325652/fopitisevala_ruxupivuzur_nuzuxofor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ledimame.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135306483/71d9d5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pokasejazutiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134447431/cfb3de9168d9dc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jesabison.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134379325/9d2899bfcf923c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nugelemuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739301/gimebusopibeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://varowuzogan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856285/demevidi-xefamagiruj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pugotaba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135302821/bubefaxuriwuwa_pokobo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xizotikozuza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134587863/befeduzemik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://farupixin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314126/1644554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/91ed1f47-8fd4-410e-a037-df7283f376a1/fluent_python_book_buy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ravowibosu.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144477633/genie_intellicode_remote_stopped_working.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c6428a48-f206-4054-92d3-61b501e43ed9/fiesta_1980_junot_diaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6e197a9e-83a5-4b2e-a964-032b6f02e006/how_to_do_standard_deviation_on_calculator_ti_30x_iis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/849af523-edb1-4634-b021-5f2da339f4b1/what_are_the_different_types_of_lettering.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4ed95477-4f64-4d63-b64b-77d2a9b56d37/61769426761.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fc99d942-0243-49cb-ba3d-208cfdc59379/73169902288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vifogajo.pbworks.com/f/rpo_offense_playbook.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bovozajezo.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144446337/what_do_you_do_at_a_target_orientation.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f166.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF166 5560 bytes
SHA-256: 28d0ca244a4bc52d474bc88e324afa23f57844db56957c3aeaa901cc34cec6da
font_01_sfnt_off0001043e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1043E 11116 bytes
SHA-256: f62a4e288e423f7b4c0e3d85f7b721587cae2386aa8179cddcf83079b59bca19